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Abstract. The paper analyzes the role of guarantees on loan interest rates 
before and during the recent financial crisis in Italian firm financing. The paper 
improves  on  existing  literature  by  distinguishing  between  real  and  personal 
guarantees.  Further,  the  paper  investigates  the  potential  different  role  of 
guarantees in the bank-borrower relationship during the recent financial crisis. 
This paper draws from individual Italian bank and firm data taken from the 
Banks’ Supervisory Reports to the Bank of Italy and the Central Credit Register 
over the period 2006-2009.   
Our analysis demonstrates that collateral affects the cost of credit of Italian 
firms  by  systematically  reducing  the  interest  rate  of  secured  loans,  while 
personal guarantees increase it. These effects are amplified during the crisis. 
Furthermore,  guarantees  are  a  more  powerful  instrument  for  ex-ante  riskier 
borrowers  than  for  safer  borrowers.  Indeed,  riskier  borrowers  obtain 
significantly lower interest rates on secured loans than interest rate they would 
be charged on unsecured loans.  
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1. Introduction 
The importance of guarantees in bank lending activity is widely acknowledged, and 
their  role  is  even  recognized  in  the  Basel  Capital  Accords  that  foresee  a  specific 
regulation for secured loans. Moreover, there is extensive literature that deals with the 
role of guarantees in determining the cost and the availability of credit, and borrower 
characteristics that have a greater effect on collateral requirements. In the presence of 
informational opacity, collateral and guarantees are powerful tools useful for mitigating 
adverse selection problems that may arise at the loan origination, and moral hazard risk 
that arises after credit has been granted (Berger and Udell, 1990). Indeed, the provision 
of  real  and  personal  guarantees  has  always  been  facilitating  bank  credit  access, 
especially during economic crises (Cowling, 2010). 
This paper aims at analyzing the role played by collateral and personal guarantees on 
bank-loan interest rates granted to Italian firms by means of a large dataset drawn from 
the Central Credit Register for the period 2006-2009. The Central Credit Register is an 
information  system  regarding  the  debt  of  the  customers  of  the  banks  and  financial 
companies supervised by the Bank of Italy. By means of the Central Credit Register the 
Bank of Italy provides intermediaries with a service intended to improve the quality of 
the lending of the credit system and ultimately to enhance its stability. The purpose of 
this paper is twofold. Firstly, to model and estimate a bank-loan supply function in 
order to understand the role and the relative weights of the two types of guarantees in 
the  setting  of  bank  interest  rates.  Secondly,  to  understand  if  and  how  Italian  bank 
behaviour has changed during the recent economic and financial crisis.
1  
Pozzolo (2004) studied the effects of secured and unsecured loans on interest rates in 
the loan market of Italian firms. In his work he controlled for the presence of guarantees 
by means of two dummy variables (one for collateral and one for personal guarantees). 
The novelty of the paper is: a) the use of a larger database than Pozzolo’s, spanned from 
2006 to 2009; b) the use of the guarantee-loan ratios as explanatory variables. Indeed, 
we expect that interest rates depend upon the relative value of guarantees with respect to 
the size of the granted loan, and not only upon the presence of guarantees; c) we deal 
with a single-nested panel data model in which firms may be grouped by banks, and 
estimate  a  “mixed  effects”  model  in  which  fixed-effects  are  analogous  to  standard 
regression coefficients and are estimated directly. The random effects are not directly 
estimated but are summarized according to their estimated variances and covariances. 
We assume random effects vary across banks and may take the form of either random 
intercepts or random coefficients. Whereas random intercepts represent heterogeneity 
between banks in the overall response, random coefficients represent heterogeneity in 
the  relationship  between  the  response  and  explanatory  variables,  i.e.  the  impact  of 
personal guarantees and collateral on the loan interest rate varies across banks. 
The  distinction  between  real  guarantees  (collateral)  and  personal  guarantees,  and 
their potential different role in bank-borrower relationships, plays an important role in 
models of bank interest rates. In an asymmetric information context, guarantees play a 
                                                 
1 Panetta and Signoretti (2010) show that, during recent economic and financial turmoil, the deceleration 
of Italian bank loans has been affected both by demand and supply factors. As for firms, they show that 
loan demand declined following the investment contraction, while lower levels of bank loan supply were 
the joint result of the increase in borrowers’ risk and in the degree of bank risk aversion.    3 
role  in  solving  different  problems  that  may  arise  at  loan  origination  (hidden 
information-adverse selection problems) or after the loan has  been granted (hidden 
action-moral hazard problems). 
Furthermore, a principal role is played by the distinction between inside collateral 
and outside collateral. The former is physical assets owned by the borrower, and is 
mainly used to order creditors priority in case of borrower’s default. The latter is assets 
posted by external grantors: in case of default, outside collateral enhances the claim of a 
single creditor by recurring against additional assets external to the debtor. Therefore, 
outside collateral should be more powerful than inside collateral in solving asymmetric 
information problems.  
Personal guarantees are on the other hand contractual obligations of a third party, and 
they act as external collateral. However, they do not give the lender a specific claim on 
particular  assets,  and  restrict  the  actions  (s)he  could  take  in  case  of  borrowers’ 
bankruptcy (Berger and Udell, 2000).  
The Central Credit Register database does not provide information on inside and 
outside collateral. Therefore, this paper will only discuss empirical results concerning 
the role of collateral and guarantees on bank loan interest rates charged to Italian small-
sized firms. 
This paper uses unbalanced sample data on 214 individual Italian banks and 560,339 
firms data over the period 2006-2009. 
The empirical strategy is as follows. 
Firstly, the paper estimates a bivariate probit model to understand how the crisis, 
together  with  the  borrower  observed  riskiness  and  other  variables,  influenced  the 
probability of observing secured loans. This analysis seems to confirm that guarantees 
are associated with riskier borrowers. 
Secondly, the paper estimates a multilevel model in which the dependent variable, 
i.e. the spread between the bank loan and overnight interest rates, is regressed on loan-
contract, individual-firm and -bank characteristics, and on time dummies. Our analysis 
demonstrates that collateral affects the cost of credit of Italian firms by systematically 
reducing the interest rate of secured loans, while personal guarantees increase it. These 
effects are amplified during the crisis. Furthermore, guarantees are a more powerful 
instrument  for  ex-ante  riskier  borrowers  than  for  safer  borrowers.  Indeed,  riskier 
borrowers obtain significantly lower interest rates on secured loans than interest rate 
they would be charged on unsecured loans.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the theoretical and empirical 
literature,  while  Section  3  describes  the  data  used  and  provides  some  descriptive 
statistics; Section 4 describes the empirical model, the estimation strategy and discusses 
the findings. Section 5 concludes.  
2. Review of the literature 
The  role  of  collateral  and  guarantees  on  bank  lending  activity  has  been  widely 
discussed. In this section we focus on the main contributions that analyze the theoretical 
and empirical relationship between guarantees and loan interest rates.  
Theoretically, under perfect information, the bank can distinguish between different 
types of borrowers, and has perfect knowledge about the riskiness of their investment 
projects. In this setting guarantees are used to reduce the potential loss that the bank   4 
would incur in the case of borrowers’ default. According to the “sort by observed risk 
paradigm” observably risky borrowers are asked to pledge collateral while observably 
safe borrowers are not (Berger and Udell, 1990). 
Under asymmetric information guarantees play a role in solving different problems 
that  may  arise  at  loan  origination  (hidden  information)  or  after  the  loan  is  granted 
(hidden action). 
A hidden information-adverse selection problem arises in situations in which banks 
cannot  discern  the  ex-ante  riskiness  of  the  entrepreneur.  Without  guarantees,  the 
average loan rate would be higher than the optimal rate for safe borrowers, and only 
riskier borrowers would apply for banks loans. In these situations, guarantees act as a 
signaling device to distinguish the ex-ante riskiness of the entrepreneur: the low risk 
borrower will choose a contract with guarantees in order to take advantage of a lower 
interest rate (Bester, 1985 and 1987; Besanko and Thakor, 1987).  
A  hidden  action-moral  hazard  problem  arises  when  banks  cannot  observe  the 
borrower behavior after the loan has been granted. In these situations, guarantees are 
used as an incentive device, and reduce the debtor incentive to strategically default. As 
Boot et al. (1991) have shown, if there is substitutability between the borrower quality 
and action, the riskier borrower pledges more guarantees, while the safe borrower gets 
an unsecured loan. Guarantees are used as an incentive device:  secured loans are made 
to riskier borrowers to reduce the debtor incentive to strategically default.  
Therefore, three alternatives define the correlation between loan interest rate and 
guarantees.  
First, the risk premium and guarantees are negative correlated if guarantees are used 
as a signaling device to solve the adverse selection problem.  
Second,  the  correlation  between  guarantees  and  risk  premium  is  still  negative  if 
guarantees are used as an incentive device to reduce moral hazard, and guarantees more 
than compensate the borrower risk.  
Finally,  the  correlation  between  guarantees  and  risk  premium i s  positive  if 
guarantees are used as an incentive device to reduce moral hazard, and guarantees do 
not compensate the borrower risk. 
Empirical results on the impact of collateral and personal guarantees on the loan rate 
are mixed.  
There are studies that find a positive impact of guarantees on interest rates. 
Berger and Udell (1990, 1995), by using a large dataset on American commercial 
loans, have found that interest rates on secured loans are on average higher than those 
on unsecured loans. Guarantees are most often associated with riskier borrowers, riskier 
loans, and riskier banks. This result supports the idea that observably riskier borrowers 
are asked to pledge more guarantees to mitigate the moral hazard problem.  
Casolaro et al. (2008), using information on syndicated credit facilities granted to 
borrowers of over 80 countries between 1990 and 2001, have also found that secured 
loans have larger interest rate spreads than unsecured loans. 
Ono and Uesugi (2009), who have investigated the determinants of collateral and 
personal guarantees in the small business loan market in Japan, have reached similar 
results. The authors have found that both collateral and personal guarantees increase 
interest  rates  charged  on  loans  and  the  finding  is  robust  to  potential  guarantees 
endogeneity. The authors conclude that guarantees are useful in mitigating the moral 
hazard as they are more likely to be pledged by riskier borrowers.   5 
Ogawa et al. (2010) use a matched sample of Japanese small firms and main banks, 
and investigate bank-firm relationships in the early 2000s. The authors have concluded 
that  personal  guarantees  positively  affect  the  interest  rates  charged  on  small  firms 
lending.  
Other studies find a negative impact of guarantees on interest rates. 
Harhoff  and  Korting  (1998)  present  a  study  of  the  lending  relationship  between 
banks and SMEs in Germany. The authors have concluded that interest rates on SME 
secured loans are lower than those on SME unsecured loans. 
Jimènez,  Salas-Fumàs  and  Saurina  (2006)  have  uncovered  direct  evidence  of  a 
negative association between collateral and the borrower’s risk.  
In  a  principal-agent  setting,  John  et  al.  (2003)  have  concluded  that  guarantees 
decrease the riskiness of a given loan, and that collateralized debt has a higher yield 
than general debt, after controlling for credit rationing.  
Pozzolo  (2004),  Bonaccorsi  di  Patti  (2006)  and  Calcagnini  et  al.  (2011)  provide 
evidence for Italy.  
Pozzolo  (2004)  has  found  that  real  guarantees  are  not  statistically  related  to  the 
borrower risk. He interprets this finding as potentially consistent with the hypothesis 
that  inside  collateral  is  used  as  a  signaling  device  to  solve  the  adverse  selection 
problem. On the other hand, he finds that personal guarantees are more likely to be 
asked for when the borrower is ex-ante riskier. However, once the borrower’s riskiness 
is controlled for, both real and personal guarantees reduce the interest rate charged on 
loans.  
Bonaccorsi di Patti (2006) presents a detailed analysis of the widespread use of both 
real and personal guarantees in the loan market for Italian firms. The article finds that 
guarantees are more likely to be pledged by riskier firms, and that personal and real 
guarantees  are  positively  correlated.  Moreover,  the  article  finds  that  internal  and 
external collateral are substitutes. 
Calcagnini et al. (2011) analyze the role of collateral and guarantees on Italian micro 
firm (producer households). The authors have ascertained that collateral and personal 
guarantees affect the cost of credit of small business by systematically reducing the 
spread of secured loans, after controlling for borrower and loan riskiness, and that this 
effect is amplified during the crisis. 
3. Data and Summary Statistics 
The empirical analysis uses information on lines of credit to a large sample of Italian 
nonfinancial  firms.  Data  has  been  taken  from  two  sources:  the  Banks’  Supervisory 
Reports to the Bank of Italy (Segnalazioni di Vigilanza) and the Central Credit Register 
(Centrale dei Rischi). The first source is used for data on banks’ balance sheets. The 
second contains information on single bank loans, the interest rates charged and the 
value of the assets posted as guarantees (distinguished between real and personal).
2 
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2 The Central Credit Register is regulated by the resolution adopted by the Credit Committee on 29 March 
1994  pursuant  to  Articles  53,  67  and  107  of  the  Banking  Law.  The  following  participate  in  this 
centralized service: 
– banks entered in the register referred to in Article 13 of the Banking Law; 
– financial intermediaries entered in the register of banking groups and/or the special register referred to 
in, respectively, Articles 64 and 107 of the Banking Law that engage exclusively or primarily in financing   6 
We use data on firm financing for the period 2006-2009 for a total of 560,339 firms 
and 214 banks.  
Table 1 shows the distribution (% values) of firms’ loans by type of guarantees for 
the  period  1999-2009.  The  share  of  loans  granted  by  collateral  (mainly  mortgages) 
constantly increased. The faster rate of growth observed in the first type of loans has 
been  compensated  by  the  share  of  loans  granted  by  personal  guarantees,  that  are 
potentially riskier than collateral as they represent a generic claim on the wealth of the 
grantor, who has therefore a large degree of freedom and could possibly default on it. 
Finally, all other types of unsecured loans (labelled as ‘Unsecured’ in Table 1) have 
been relatively constant, especially during the most recent years.  
As expected, the financial crisis has negatively affected the number of firms’ loans, 
especially of unsecured loans that decreased by 28% from 2008 to 2009. Loans granted 
by personal guarantees and collateral decreased by 18% and 22%, respectively (Table 
2).  This  dynamic  can  be  mainly  explained  by  negative  demand  effects ( fewer 
investments,  fewer  mortgages  and  fewer  collateralized  loans),  but  also  by  banks 
tightening their credit, and higher bank risk aversion.
4  
The average size of loans granted by collateral is typically larger than the average 
size of the other types of loans (Table 3).  Furthermore, descriptive statistics show that 
the average size of unsecured loans or loans granted by personal guarantees decreased 
more than the average size of collateralized loans (-16%,  -21%, and -0.01% from 2008 
to 2009, respectively). 
                                                                                                                                              
activity. Financial intermediaries more than 50 per cent of whose financing activity consists of consumer 
credit are exempted. Consequently, the group of financial intermediaries reporting to the Central Credit 
Register is not identical to the group that transmits supervisory returns. 
Participating intermediaries also report the exposures of foreign branches to borrowers resident in Italy. 
All the statistical distributions take such loans into account. 
Once a month intermediaries are required to report each customer's debtor position, comprising both 
individual and joint liabilities (joint accounts and partnerships). 
The  whole  position  relative  to  a  given  customer  must  be  reported  where  even  one  of  the  following 
conditions applies:  
the sum of credit granted or used for all loans and guarantees granted to the customer is at least 30,000 
euros; 
the total value of personal guarantees provided by the customer is at least 30,000 euros;  
the  customer's  position  is  classified  among  bad  debts  or  is  written  off  during  the  reference  month, 
regardless of the amount; 
the face value of factoring claims the intermediary has acquired from the customer is at least 30,000 
euros; 
the value of the transactions carried out by the intermediary on behalf of third parties is at least 30,000 
euros. 
Where a report is made because one of the above conditions applies, it must cover all the outstanding 
positions of the customer in question (Bank of Italy, 2010, p.117). 
3 Before 2009 the threshold was 75,000 euros. Once we account for this change, the findings shown in 
Tables 2, 3, and 4 are actually reinforced. 
 
4 The large decrease in the number of contracts in the database could be partially due to statistical changes 
which occurred in personal or firm data, and industry reclassifications which occurred in 2009. However, 
variables’ trend in our database are consistent with those observed in the data referred to the whole 
population of banks and households businesses. Indeed, from 2008 to 2009, the total number of lending 
contracts in Italy decreased by 20.47%. See  
http://bip.bancaditalia.it/4972unix/homebipita.htm  
   7 
Loan interest rate decreased between 2008 and 2009, especially for collateralized 
loans (see Table 4). Indeed, in Italy, during the crisis, following the negative trend of 
official interest rates, the cost of credit decreased significantly and in 2009 interest rates 
were  3.9  and  3.1  percent  points  lower  than  2008  levels  for  variable  interest  rate 
contracts and fixed interest rate contracts, respectively (Panetta and Signoretti, 2010).  
However, interest rate spreads has been increasing since 2006, and they have been 
higher  for  unsecured  loans  than  for  loans  secured  by  guarantees,  especially  for 
collateralized loans. Between 2008 and 2009 the spread on firm collateralized loans 
decreased (-0.13) (see Table 5). 
Summing up, descriptive statistics show a correlation between loan interest rates and 
real and personal guarantees, as secured loans demonstrate both lower interest rates and 
lower increases in the spreads during the observed period.  
To disentangle the direct effect of real and personal guarantees (and their interaction 
with  the  crisis  and  with  the  type  of  customer)  on  the  cost  of  credit,  we  estimate 
multilevel  model  relating  interest  rate  spreads  to  loan  contracts,  firm,  and  bank 
characteristics.  
4. Model specification and estimation strategy 
4.1 Determinants of personal and real guarantees: Bivariate Probit Model  
The empirical strategy consists of a two-step analysis. In the first step, we aim at 
estimating the determinants of collateral and personal guarantees. In particular, we want 
to verify if previous findings about the role of collateral and personal guarantees in 
solving adverse selection and moral hazard problems are confirmed, i.e. high quality 
debtors may use collateral as a signal device, while riskier borrowers are requested to 
post personal guarantees as an incentive device to solve moral hazard problems.  
We  assume  that  the  conditional  probability  of  the  firm  to  post  guarantees, 
Pr(GUAR=1|X), given a cumulative distribution function Φ (.), depends on loan, firm 
and bank characteristics. Moreover, we add time dummies to capture the impact of the 
financial crisis.  
Collateral and personal guarantees are jointly determined and depend on the same set 
of variables. Therefore, the error correlation between the two types of guarantees may 
be different from zero, and we estimate the following bivariate probit model: 
€ 
pij = Pr (GUARij,t =1| X) = Φ(X'β)
with
X'β = β1RISKijt + β2LOAN _Sijt + β3FIRM_Sijt + β4PRIVijt + β5LEND_RELijt +
+β6NUM _RELijt + β7BANK _S j + β8CENTRAL j + β9SOUTH j + β'TIME _Dt +εijt (1)
 
Variables used in model (1) are described in details in the data Appendix.  
Table 6 reports data summary statistics. 
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 7 report the marginal effects of the bivariate probit 
model (1), in which the likelihood ratio test rejects the null of zero correlation between 
the errors of the two probit models (see Table 7 rho labeled LR test).    8 
Results support the hypothesis that guarantees are associated to riskier borrowers. 
We capture customer risk by using a measure of observed risk (RISK) given by the 
“substandard” loan of the firm in temporary difficulties.
5  
The estimated coefficient of RISK is positive and statistically significant in both 
columns:  riskier  borrowers  have  a  higher  probability  of  posting  real  or  personal 
guarantees.  
While the impact of loan size (LOAN_S) on personal guarantees is negative but 
small in absolute values (column (1)), LOAN_S increases the probability of loans to be 
secured by collateral (column (2)): the result is likely to be driven by the presence of 
mortgages which, by the Italian code, have to be collateralized.
6  
Large firms (FIRM_S, proxied by the loan size) have a lower probability of posting 
personal  guarantees  than  firms  of  smaller  size.  The  finding  reflects  the  stronger 
bargaining  power  of  large  firms  than  other  firms.  As  for  the  positive  estimated 
coefficient of FIRM_S in column (2), the result is likely driven by the presence of 
mortgages: FIRM_S is a binary dummy variable which takes a value of 1 when the loan 
value is equal or greater €1,000,000 and 0 when the loan value is less than €1,000,000.
7 
Private companies are asked to post personal guarantees: the estimated coefficient of 
PRIV is positive in column (1) of Table (7). The finding is consistent with the fact that 
personal guarantees are only external to the firm and they are typically posted by the 
proprietorship. On the other hand, private companies have stronger bargaining power 
than  public  companies,  and  reach  better  contract  conditions.  Therefore,  private 
companies have a lower probability of posting collateral and the estimated coefficient of 
PRIV is negative in column (2) of Table (7).  
Long-term  lending  relationships  (LEND_REL)  between  banks  and  customers 
negatively affect the probability of posting both personal guarantees and collateral. On 
the one hand, a long-term banking relationship may benefit the borrowers by helping to 
build trust between borrowers and lenders, and consequently to reduce moral hazard. If 
guarantees  are  asked  to  solve  moral  hazard  problems,  the  probability  of  posting 
guarantees decreases the longer the lending relationship (Boot and Thakor, 1994). On 
the other hand, longer lending relationships could be associated with a higher use of 
collateral if long-term relationships generate more severe hold-up problems (Ogawa et 
al.  2010).  The  findings  suggest  that  the  negative  effects  of  the  hold-up  problem 
dominate the benefits of the relationship lending.  
Furthermore, an increasing multiple lending relationships (NUM_REL) negatively 
affects the probability of posting both collateral and personal guarantees. The result is 
consistent both with the hypothesis that “banks are unwilling to require a guarantee on 
their loans if this has the side effect of making implicitly available to competing lenders 
the result of their screening activity” (Pozzolo, 2004 p.14) and with the fact that firms 
take actions against the monopoly power of a main bank, and eventually get better 
contract conditions, in the presence of multiple-bank relationships (Ogawa et al, 2010). 
The probability for firms to post personal guarantees is slightly higher if banks are 
large (BANK_S=1). However, the probability to post collateral if banks are large is 
                                                 
5 In empirical literature the interest rate charged on the loan is often used as the measure of customer 
riskiness. The use of an observed measure of customer riskiness such as RISK allows controlling for the 
endogeneity issue concerning guarantees.  
6 In our data we do not have enough information to distinguish between different types of loans. 
7 This threshold is used in the statistics of European Central Bank and in several Bank of Italy papers.   9 
lower.  The latter finding is consistent with the theoretical and empirical literature 
according to which larger banks have a higher ability to evaluate customer risk and, 
therefore,  screen  riskier  investment  projects.  Particularly,  secured  loans  may  be 
considered  by  the  lender  as  an  alternative  to  screen  and  evaluate  borrower  or  loan 
riskiness. Smaller banks generally have a lower level of expertise and scarce resources 
to  evaluate  the  economic  loan  risks.  Therefore,  they  have  more  incentives  to  use 
collateral  instead  of  undertaking  a  project  evaluation  (Manove  and  Padilla  (1999); 
Manove, Padilla and Pagano (2001); Jiménez, Salas and Saurina (2006)).  
Bank  regional  location  plays  a  significant  role  on  the  likelihood  of  posting  both 
personal guarantees and collateral. Compared to banks located in the North of Italy, 
loans provided by banks in Central Italy (CENTRAL) or in the South (SOUTH) show a 
higher probability of requiring guarantees or collateral. 
The economic and financial crisis increases the probability of loans to be secured, 
especially during the year 2009.  
To capture the impact of both large- and medium-sized firms on interest spreads, 
columns (3) and (4) of Table 7 show the estimated coefficients of model (1) in which 
we use an alternative measure of firm size with respect to FIRM_S. LARGE is again a 
dummy variable that takes value equal to one if the loan granted is greater or equal to 
250,000 euro. In the sample, the 44.75% of loans is greater or equal to this threshold 
while only the 13.51% is greater or equal to 1,000,000 euro. The estimates confirm 
previous findings that larger loans have a higher probability to post real guarantees.  
4.2 Interest rate model 
 
The previous Section analyzed the determinants of real and personal guarantees, and 
results show that riskier borrowers have a higher probability of posting both real and 
personal guarantees as an incentive device to solve moral hazard problems.  
This Section focuses on the impact of guarantees on loan interest rates. 
The following simple interest rate model may well describe the bank loan market: 
 
     rij = r(L) + markupij + riskpremiumij    (2) 
 
where rij is the interest rate charged to customer i by bank j. We assume that rij is a 
function of the market interest rate (r(L)), plus a mark-up and a risk premium.  
We assume that r(L) is a positive function of the market loan demand, given a fixed 
savings supply in the short term. Here, r(L) is the overnight interest rate which is the 
same for all banks.  
The mark-up term captures banks’ market power. We assume that the mark-up varies 
across customers inversely with the customer size (FIRM_S) and directly with the bank 
size (BANK_S). Moreover, the number of bank relationships (NUM_REL) and the time 
length (number of years) of the lending relationship (LEND_REL) may also affect the 
mark-up. While we expect a negative impact for the first variable, the impact of the 
length of the lending relationship is not known a priori. On one side, a longer lending 
relationship should increase loan interest rates by generating an information monopoly 
that enables banks to extract rents from borrowers. On the other, a long-term banking 
relationship may benefit the borrowers: borrowers pay higher interest rates and pledge   10 
guarantees early in the relationship, but, once their first project is successful, they are 
awarded with unsecured loans and lower loan rates (Boot and Thakor, 1994).  
The risk premium is the interest rate component that positively depends on customer 
and loan riskiness. We capture customer risk by means of a measure of observed risk, 
RISK,  as  described  in  Section  3.1.  The  customer  risk  depends  on  other  firm 
characteristics, such as if the firm is private or not (PRIV). 
Loan  riskiness  depends  positively  on  loan  size  (LOAN_S).  It  is  possible  that 
LOAN_S may capture firm size. If this were the case the estimated coefficient of this 
variable may have sign opposite to what it is expected.  
Moreover, we make use of additional information on the presence of guarantees to 
control for customers’ risk. Specifically, we use the relative (to the loan size) amount of 
collateral (COLL) and personal guarantees (PERS) posted, and a dummy (DOUBLEG) 
to  capture  the  contemporaneous  presence  of  both  types  of  guarantees.  However,  as 
described in Section 2, the impact of guarantees on interest rate is not defined a priori. 
Indeed, guarantees may be used as a signal of high quality debtor, and therefore we 
should  expect  a  negative  impact  on  interest  rate;  or  riskier  borrowers  may  post 
guarantees, and therefore we should expect a positive impact of guarantees on interest 
rate.  
Finally,  we  control  for  banks’  geographical  location  by  means  of  three  dummy 
variables (NORTH, CENTRAL and SOUTH).
8 
Since r(L) and rij are highly correlated, we opted for a slightly different version of 
model (2) where the dependent variable is the spread between the two interest rates 
(SPDi,j, = rij - r(L)).  
As explanatory variables we have three main groups of variates: 
- a vector Xi,j,t containing the characteristics of each loan contract: COLL, PERS, 
DOUBLEG and LOAN_S;  
-  a  vector  Fi,t  containing  firm  characteristics:  RISK,  NUM_REL,  LEND_REL, 
FIRM_S, PRIV;  
- a vector Bj,t containing bank characteristics: BANK_S, CENTRAL and SOUTH. 
Furthermore, our model includes time-dummy variables to identify the impact of the 
economic crisis and two interaction variables that are expected to capture the impact of 
the  financial  crisis  on  real  and  personal  guarantee  requirements  CRISIS*COLL  and 
CRISIS*PERS, respectively.  
The empirical equation takes the following form: 
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
 
                                                 
8 To determine if our interest rate model can be correctly identified as a supply function, we should 
assume that the variance of the stochastic term in the loan offer function is smaller than the corresponding 
variance in the loan asking function. This assumption seems acceptable given that, for instance, a given 
bank forces its lending officers to follow certain common techniques of credit analysis that may result in 
more precision in processing lending application (i.e. in a lower stochastic variance). Diversely, 
borrowers are subjected to industry specific seasonal and cyclical shocks; moreover, firm treasures are not 
compelled to behave similarly when they apply for loans. Both reasons imply a larger stochastic variance 
for the loan asking function (see Hester (1967), p.132).   11 
 
The subscript i refers to firms, j to banks, t to time periods. ui,j,t  is a disturbance with 
a multiway error-components structure: 
 ui,j,t = αi + λi,j + εi,j,t 
where αi, λi,j and εi,j,t are assumed to be i.i.d., and are mutually independent.  
Antweiler  (2001)  derived  the  maximum  likelihood  estimator  for  panel  data  with 
unbalanced  hierarchies.  We  deal  with  a  single-nested  panel  in  which  firms  may  be 
grouped  by  banks,  and  estimate  a  “mixed  effects”  model  in  which  a  fixed-effects 
approach is used to estimate regression coefficients and a random-effects approach is 
used for the low-level group, i.e. banks.  
The multilevel analysis assumes that the latent variables, or random effects, can be 
interpreted  as  unobserved  heterogeneity  at  the  different  levels  inducing  dependence 
among all lower-level units in the same higher-level unit. Whereas random intercepts 
represent heterogeneity between clusters in the overall response, random coefficients 
represent  heterogeneity  in  the  relationship  between  the  response  and  explanatory 
variables (Rabe-Hesketh et al., 2004). Figure (1) represents the data structure. We have 
information on bank loans granted to firms. Each bank grants loans to many firms. The 
paper estimates model (3) both under the assumption that the intercept is random and 
the overall response varies across banks; and under the assumption that the slope is also 
random,  i.e.  the  impact  of  guarantees  and  collateral  on  the  loan  interest  rate  varies 
across banks. Moreover, we allow for correlation among random effects by assuming an 
unstructured variance-covariance matrix. 




Figure 1. Nested panel data model 
 
Table 8 shows the estimated coefficients of the multilevel models. The likelihood 
ratio test rejects the null of no random effects for all specifications (see Table 8 re 
labeled LR test, p-value reported).  
Different model specifications are shown in Table 8. First, we estimated model (3) 
both under the assumption that the intercept is random, and under the assumption that 
                                                 
9 The panel data is not a pure nested model, as we have some firms that have loans from different banks 
in each period. Therefore, for robustness checks purposes, we estimate model (3) considering only firms 
that do not have multiple bank relationships (NUM_REL=1) in each year. Estimates confirm the findings 
of Tables (9) and (10).   12 
the slope is also random, i.e. the impact of guarantees and collateral on the loan 
interest rate varies across banks. Testing the two specifications by means of the Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC) and the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), according to 
which “small is better”, the latter specification is preferred to the former. Therefore, 
column (1) of Table 8 shows the estimated coefficients of the multilevel model (3) with 
random intercept and random slope, but without the interaction variables CRISIS*PERS 
and CRISIS*COLL.  
As expected, riskier firms are charged higher interest rates: the estimated coefficient 
of RISK is positive and statistically significant. 
Results  show  that  collateral  (COLL)  and  personal  guarantees  (PERS)  affect  loan 
interest rates differently. While the presence of collateral (COLL) decreases the interest 
rate,  the  presence  of  personal  guarantees  (PERS)  increases  it.  These  findings  are 
consistent  with  the  idea  that  once  banks  control  for  the  borrower  risk,  collateral 
decreases interest rates, while the positive estimated coefficient of PERS shows that 
personal guarantees are potentially riskier than collateral as they represent a generic 
claim on the wealth of the grantor, who has therefore a large degree of freedom and 
could  possibly  default  on  it.  Furthermore,  it  confirms  previous  studies  according  to 
which personal guarantees are associated to a higher observed borrower risk that might 
not  be  fully  captured  by  the  RISK  variable  (Pozzolo,  2004).  The  contemporaneous 
presence of both types of guarantees (DOUBLEG) does not affect the interest rate on 
loan.  
Loan size (LOAN_S) and firm size (FIRM_S) show an inverse relationship with 
interest rate, as larger loans and larger firms pay a lower interest rate. In these cases the 
scale  effect  of  the  loan  size  more  than  counterbalances  the  potentially  higher  risk 
associated to loans of larger size. Larger loans are likely associated to larger firms that 
have a stronger bargaining power and contract a lower interest rate.  
A  stronger  bargaining  power  is  also  likely  associated  to  private  companies  as 
opposite to state owned companies as the estimated coefficient of PRIV is negative and 
statistically significant at one percent level.   
As for other firm characteristics, the lending relationship (LEND_REL) does not 
affect the interest rate, while the number of lending relationships (NUM_REL), which 
may be also interpreted as a measure of borrower riskiness, decreases interest rates. 
Indeed, multiple bank relationships may solve the hold up problem that arises for a firm 
with one close bank: firms take actions against the monopoly power of a main bank and 
eventually pay a lower interest rate (Ogawa et al, 2010).  
While bank size does not affect loan interest rates, banks located in the Centre and 
the South of Italy charge a higher interest rate than banks in the North. Finally, time 
dummies  account  for  the  effects  of  the  financial  crisis  on  interest  rates.  Their 
coefficients  are  highly  statistically  significant  and  positive  reflecting  the  increase  in 
interest rates between 2006-2009.  
To account for the potential interaction of the crisis with the presence of collateral 
and guarantees, column (2) of Table 8 shows the estimated coefficients of model (3). 
Overall, estimates shown in column (2) confirm the findings of column (1). 
Specifically, the estimates show that during the crisis loans secured by collateral 
systematically pay lower interest rates, as the coefficient of CRISIS*COLL is negative 
and statistically significant. The result, together with the negative estimated coefficients   13 
of COLL, underlines that collateral contributes not only to grant credit (as shown by 
descriptive statistics in Table2 2 and 3) but also to reduce loan interest rate. 
As  for  personal  guarantees,  the  estimates  suggest  that  loans  secured  by  personal 
guarantees are riskier or associated to riskier borrowers as both the estimated coefficient 
of CRISIS*PERS is negative but the marginal effect of personal guarantees on interest 
rate is still positive.  
Finally, the longer the lending relationship (LEND_REL) is, the higher the interest 
rate. The finding is not new to empirical literature (see Harhoff et al., 1998; Petersen 
and Rajan, 1994 for a survey of the empirical literature). Chakravarty and Yilmazer 
(2009) assert that the overall granting process is a sequential process given by three 
stages:  application,  decision  and  rate  setting.  The  authors  find  that  the  lending 
relationship  matters  only  in  the  first  and  second  stages,  i.e.:  conditional  on  being 
approved,  relationships  are  not  important  in  determining  the  loan  rate.  Similarly, 
Petersen and Rajan (1994) do not find statistical evidence that the strength of the lender-
borrower  relationship  is  correlated  with  cheaper  credit.  Moreover,  our  dataset 
composition  contains  different  types  of  loans  for  which  reputation  and  relationship 
effects may be less important (Berger and Udell, 1995). Therefore, in our sample, the 
length  of  the  lending  relationship  may  capture  not  only  the  strength  of  the  bank-
borrower relationship, but also a monopoly power of a main bank that asks for higher 
interest rates.   
All model specifications find that riskier firms pay higher interest rates. Column (3) 
shows the estimated coefficients of model (3) in which we further control for the impact 
of the interaction of firm risk with guarantees on loan interest rates by adding two 
interaction variables RISK*COLL and RISK*PERS. Estimates show that the negative 
impact of guarantees on loan interest rates is higher the riskier the firm: ceteris paribus, 
guarantees are a more powerful instrument for ex-ante riskier borrowers than for safer 
borrowers. Indeed, riskier borrowers obtain significantly lower interest rates on secured 
loans than the interest rate they would be charged on unsecured loans.  
To capture the impact of both large- and medium-sized firms on the interest spreads, 
column (4) shows the estimated coefficients of model (3) in which the variable LARGE 
is used instead of the variable FIRM_S to measure firm size. The estimated coefficient 
shows that medium- and large-sized firms pay lower interest rates than smaller firms. 
Overall, the estimates confirm findings in columns (1)-(3) of Table 8. 
To check the robustness of our results column (5) in Table 8 shows the estimated 
coefficients of the baseline model specification of column (1) when treating real and 
personal guarantees as endogenous variables. Guarantees might be endogenous due to 
unmeasured and unmeasurable influences acting at firm or bank levels such as the fact 
that interest rates and guarantees are simultaneously set at the time of a loan approval.
 10  
In multilevel analysis, the unmeasured influences of omitted variables or measurement 
error  in  the  fixed  part  gets  incorporated  in  the  random  part  of  the  model,  thereby 
violating  the  assumption  of  the  independence  of  regressors  and  model  disturbances 
(Ebbes et al., 2004). If this is the case, the OLS estimated coefficients are biased, and 
instrumental  variables  (IV)  estimation  techniques  can  be  used  to  reduce  the  bias 
(Spencer and Fielding, 2000).  
                                                 
10 All bank level variables in model (3) are exogenous. Therefore, we rule out bank-level endogeneity and 
only take into account firm level endogeneity.    14 
First of all, to obtain IV estimates of model (3), we used Lewbel’s approach to 
construct ‘internal instruments’ (Lewbel, 1997) and then estimated separate multilevel 
models for COLL and PERS as function of the instruments and all the other exogenous 
variables included in the model.   
Secondly,  we  used  the  predictions  of  the  endogenous  variables,  IVCOLL  and 
IVPERS, as variables in model (3) to obtain consistent estimates of the fixed-effects 
parameters. Then, we corrected the coefficients’ variance-covariance matrix by means 
of the ‘real’ mean square error (Baltagi, 2002).
11  
IV estimates confirm the previous finding about collateral, while personal guarantees 
have no statistically significant effect on interest rates. Even if personal guarantees are 
external (and therefore should be more powerful in solving adverse selection or moral 
hazard problems), they are potentially riskier than collateral as they represent a generic 
claim on the wealth of the grantor, who has therefore a large degree of freedom and 
could  possibly  default  on  it.  However,  the  estimated  coefficient  of  DOUBLEG  is 
positive and statistically significant: it is likely that riskier borrowers are requested to 
post both types of guarantees. 
Table 8 shows the fixed-effects estimates of model (3). As for guarantees, fixed 
effects refer to the overall expected effect of the presence of real or personal guarantees 
on interest rates. However, according to our model specification, random effects also 
depend on guarantees. Random effects measure whether the impact of guarantees on 
interest rates differs among banks / from bank to bank. 
Table  9  shows  the  estimated  random-effects  parameters  of  model  specification 
shown  in  column  (1)  of  Table  8.  The  variance  component  of  the  random  intercept 
(Standard  dev  (CONSTANT))  is  statistically  significant,  meaning  that  interest  rates 
significantly  differ  across  banks.  Furthermore,  the  slopes  of  collateral  and  personal 
guarantees also show statically significant variance components, (Standard dev(COLL)) 
and  (Standard  dev(PERS)),  respectively.  Therefore,  real  guarantees  and  personal 
guarantees affect loan interest rates through random effects that differ across banks.  
All  variance  components  can  be  used  to  partition  the  variance  across  levels  and 
compute the intra-class correlation coefficient (ICC) of interest rates within a cluster 
(bank). 
Specifically, the intra-class correlation coefficient is the proportion of the interest 











2 = 0.15,  
 
meaning that the 15% of the interest rate total variance is attributable to bank-level 
differences (Albright and Marinova, 2010). 
Finally, the correlations between bank intercepts and slopes (Covariance (COLL, 
CONSTANT))  and  (Covariance  (PERS,  CONSTANT))  are  positive  and  statistically 
significant  across  banks.  Therefore,  given  the  negative  estimated  coefficient  of 
collateral  (see  Table  8),  the  decrease  in  interest  rates  for  a  one  percent  increase  in 
guarantees is larger for banks charging higher average interest rates. 
                                                 
11 The latter is constructed by taking into account the best linear unbiased prediction of the random part of 
the baseline model.   15 
5. Conclusions 
This paper analyzed the role of guarantees on loan interest rates charged on Italian 
firms’ loans. In addition, it tried to understand bank behavior before and during the 
recent financial crisis.   
The  bivariate  probit  analysis  showed  that  the  probability  of  loans  to  be  secured 
increased during the recent financial crises. Moreover, the probability of loans to be 
secured by real or personal guarantees increases with firm riskiness.  
Estimates  from  our  interest  rate  model  showed  that  loan  interest  rates  respond 
differently to collateral and personal guarantees. Collateral helps reduce loan interest 
rates charged to firms, once we control for borrower and loan riskiness, before and 
during the financial crisis. As for personal guarantees, once we control for variables’ 
endogeneity, our findings show that personal guarantees have no impact on loan interest 
rates.  Indeed, personal guarantees do not give the lender a specific claim on particular 
assets,  and  restrict  the  actions  (s)he  could  take  in  case  of  borrowers’  bankruptcy. 
Therefore,  they  have  no  effect  on  loan  interest  rates.  However,  during  troublesome 
periods, such as the current financial crisis, providing personal guarantees together with 
collateral is a signal of borrowers’ quality that has positive effects on interest rates. 
Finally,  results  showed  that  -  ceteris  paribus  -  guarantees  are  a  more  powerful 
instrument  for  ex-ante  riskier  borrowers  than  for  safer  borrowers.  Indeed,  riskier 
borrowers obtain significantly lower interest rates on secured loans than interest rate 
they would be charged on unsecured loans.  
Data Appendix 
The empirical analysis uses information on lines of credit to a large sample of 
Italian nonfinancial firms. Data are taken from two sources: the Banks’ Supervisory 
Reports to the Bank of Italy (Segnalazioni di Vigilanza) and the Central Credit Register 
(Centrale dei Rischi).  
Specifically,  we  draw  a  40  percent  random  sample  of  firms  from  the  Central 
Credit Register.  
We control for outliers by dropping from the sample the observations for which:  
a.  the SPD variable is less than 1; 
b.  the PERS variable is greater than 2; 
c.  the LOAN_S variable is smaller than the p1 percentile; 
d.  the LOAN_S variable is greater than the p99 percentile; 
e.  the interest rate applied is smaller than the p1 percentile; 
f.  the interest rate applied is greater than the p99 percentile. 
Our final sample has a total of 560339 firms. The panel is unbalanced.  
The variables used are defined as follows. 
SPD is the spread between the interest rate applied on loan by each bank and the 
interest rate on overnight interbank deposits. Both interest rates are averages of each 
year’s fourth quarter values. 
COLL is the share of each loan guaranteed by real guarantees. Loans are mainly 
mortgages  granted  by  banks  to  the  borrower.  This  variable  is  a  proxy  for  inside 
collateral.   16 
PERS is the share of each loan guaranteed by personal guarantees. Personal 
guarantees are granted by third parties in favour of borrowers. This variable acts as 
outside collateral. 
DOUBLEG is a binary dummy variable that takes a value of 1 when both personal 
and real guarantees are posted and 0 otherwise.  
LOAN_S is the ratio between the amount of loan granted to the firm by each bank 
in the database and the average size of loan granted to firms of the same sector. It 
represents a proxy for loan size. 
FIRM_S is a binary dummy variable which takes a value of 1 when the amount of 
loan is equal or greater €1,000,000 and 0 when the value of loan is less than €1,000,000. 
Alternatively,  we  use  the  dummy  variable  LARGE.  The  latter  is  a  binary  dummy 
variable which takes a value of 1 when the amount of loan is equal or greater € 250,000 
and 0 when the value of loan is less than € 250,000. 
RISK  is  a  dummy  variable  that  takes  value  equal  to  one  if  the  firm  has 
substandard loans, i.e. the firm is in temporary difficulty. This variable is a measure of 
ex ante (observed) credit risk of the firm. 
PRIV is a binary dummy variable, which takes a value of 1 when the borrower is a 
private firm, and 0 when the borrower is a public firm. 
LEND_REL is equal to the number of years in the sample that the firm-bank 
relationship lasts.  
NUM_REL is the number of lending relationship for each firm in each year. 
NORTH  is  a  binary  geographical  dummy  variable  that  has  a  value  of  1  for 
customers with headquarter in Northern Italy and 0 otherwise. 
CENTRAL is a binary geographical dummy variable that has a value of 1 for 
customers with headquarter in Central Italy and 0 otherwise. 
SOUTH  is  a  binary  geographical  dummy  variable  that  has  a  value  of  1  for 
customers with headquarter in Southern Italy and 0 otherwise. 
BANK_S is a binary dummy variable that has a value of 1 for banks which are 
classified as “major” or “large” according to the classification of Bank of Italy by size; 
0 otherwise (Bank of Italy, 2008).  
CRISIS*COLL represents the interaction between real guarantees (COLL) and a 
dummy that is equal to1 in every year of the financial crisis period (2008 and 2009); it 
is 0 in the pre-crisis years (2006 and 2007).  
CRISIS*PERS represents the interaction between personal guarantees (PERS) and 
a dummy that is equal to1 in every year of the financial crisis period (2008 and 2009); it 
is 0 in the pre-crisis years (2006 and 2007). 
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Table 1 Firms’ loans by type of guarantees (% distribution). 
  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009 
Collateral  24.0  24.9  24.6  26.6  29.7  32.0  33.8  31.3  33.2  33.8  34.9 
Personal 
Guarantees 
27.1  27.4  25.2  25.6  24.1  24.3  23.6  26.6  23.6  23.1  22.0 
Unsecured  48.8  47.7  50.2  47.8  46.2  43.7  44.5  42.1  43.2  43.0  43.2 
Source: Supervision reports - Bank of Italy. 
 




Personal and Real 
Guarantees 
Personal 
Guarantees  Real Guarantees  Total 
  Number  Δ (%)  Number  Δ (%)  Number  Δ (%)  Number  Δ (%)  Number  Δ (%) 
2006  102888    46369    119623    36511    305391   
2007  110043  6.95  54848  18.29  128620  7.52  44239  21.17  337750  10.60% 
2008  106805  -2.94  54236  -1.12  125451  -2.46  42154  -4.71  328646  -2.70% 
2009  77001  -27.91  45076  -16.89  102456  -18.33  30618  -27.37  255151  -22.36% 
Source: Our calculations on Bank of Italy data.   20 
Table 3 Average loan size and yearly change (%) by type of guarantee.  








Δ (%)  Average 
Loan Size 
Δ (%)  Average 
Loan Size 
Δ (%)  Average 
Loan Size 
Δ (%)  Average 
Loan Size 
Δ (%) 
2006  408822.99    661836.53    278489.59    757203.28    437837.68   
2007  446167.77  9.13  671755.77  1.50  289583.69  3.98  732749.05  -3.23  460708.93  5.22 
2008  511297.74  14.60  889440.31  32.41  374165.48  29.21  909482.15  24.12  572429.25  24.25 
2009  427295.38  -16.43  755298.35  -15.08  294759.28  -21.22  904557.2  -0.54  489292.96  -14.52 
Source: Our calculations on Bank of Italy data. 
 
Table 4 Interest rate and yearly change by type of guarantee.  








Δ  Average 
interest rate 
Δ  Average 
interest rate 
Δ  Average 
interest rate 
Δ  Average 
interest rate 
Δ 
2006  5.88    6.03    6.62    5.86    6.19   
2007  6.57  0.69  6.59  0.56  7.23  0.60  6.37  0.51  6.80  0.61 
2008  6.73  0.16  6.87  0.28  7.42  0.19  6.64  0.27  7.00  0.21 
2009  4.71  -2.02  4.09  -2.78  5.36  -2.06  3.78  -2.86  4.75  -2.26 
Source: Our calculations on Bank of Italy data. 
 
Table 5 Interest rate spread and yearly change by type of guarantee.  








Δ  Average 
interest rate 
Δ  Average 
interest rate 
Δ  Average 
interest rate 
Δ  Average 
interest rate 
Δ 
2006  2.52    2.67    3.26    2.50    2.83   
2007  2.62  0.10  2.64  -0.03  3.28  0.01  2.42  -0.08  2.85  0.02 
2008  3.67  1.05  3.81  1.17  4.36  1.08  3.58  1.16  3.94  1.10 
2009  4.38  0.71  3.76  -0.05  5.03  0.67  3.45  -0.13  4.42  0.47 
Source: Our calculations on Bank of Italy data.   21 
Table 6 Summary statistics of regression variables.  
Variable  Observations  Mean  Median  SD  Min  Max 
             
SPD  1226938  3.46  3.06  1.98  0.00  13.00 
COLL  1226938  0.22  0  0.38  0  1 
PERS  1226938  0.55  0.41  0.58  0  2 
LOAN_S  1226938  0.72  0.30  1.23  0.00  10.88 
LEND_REL  1226938  1.25  1  0.51  1  10 
RISK  1226938  0.05  0  0.21  0  1 
FIRM_S  1226938  0.11  0  0.32  0  1 
LARGE  1226938  0.40  0  0.49  0  1 
NUM_REL  1226938  1.77  1  1.23  1  22 
Source: Our calculations on Bank of Italy data.   22 
  
Table 7. Bivariate Probit Models: Marginal Effects. 
VARIABLES  (1) Personal 
Guarantees 
(2) Collateral  (3) Personal 
Guarantees 
(4) Collateral 
         
L.RISK  0.094***  0.126***  0.094***  0.127*** 
  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.005)  (0.002) 
LOAN_S  -0.003***  0.057***  -0.015***  0.044*** 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
FIRM_S  -0.068***  0.187***     
  (0.002)  (0.002)     
PRIV  0.149***  -0.103***  0.149***  -0.141*** 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
LEND_REL  -0.005***  -0.034***  -0.004***  -0.052*** 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
NUM_REL  -0.051***  -0.093***  -0.051***  -0.102*** 
  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
BANK_S  0.004***  -0.040***  0.004***  -0.043*** 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
CENTRAL  0.060***  0.035***  0.061***  0.035*** 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
SOUTH  0.130***  0.073***  0.130***  0.072*** 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
2007  -0.011***  0.006***  -0.010***  -0.003*** 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
2008  -0.008**  -0.003***  -0.010***  -0.021*** 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
2009  0.041***  0.023*** 
** 
0.041***  0.011*** 
**    (0.001)  (0.005)  (0.001)  (0.005) 
LARGE      -0.004***  0.256*** 
      (0.001)  (0.001) 
         
Observations  1,226,938  1,226,938  1,226,938  1,226,938 
LR test: rho=0 (p-value)  0.00  0.00 
AIC  2970161  2916730 
BIC  2970461  2917031 
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 (4)  
 
(5)  
VARIABLES  SPD  SPD  SPD  SPD  SPD 
           
RISK  1.482***  1.484***  2.321***  1.476***  1.502*** 
  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.012)  (0.007)  (0.008) 
COLL  -0.606***  -0.452***  -0.378***  -0.350***  -0.831*** 
  (0.036)  (0.036)  (0.037)  (0.035)  (0.045) 
PERS  0.300***  0.308***  0.328***  0.286***  0.003 
  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.023) 
DOUBLEG  -0.002  0.000  0.018***  0.060***  0.147*** 
  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.005) 
LOAN_S  -0.188***  -0.190***  -0.191***  -0.113***  -0.189*** 
  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.002) 
LEND_REL  0.005  0.006*  0.012***  0.026***  -0.003) 
  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
FIRM_S  -0.130***  -0.123***  -0.125***    -0.122*** 
  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)    (0.008) 
PRIV  -0.475***  -0.477***  -0.478***  -0.403***  -0.440*** 
  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004) 
NUM_REL  -0.071***  -0.070***  -0.071***  -0.046***  -0.095*** 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002) 
BANK_S  0.113  0.101  0.091  0.097  0.083 
  (0.075)  (0.075)  (0.073)  (0.074)  (0.08) 
CENTRAL  0.226***  0.226***  0.220***  0.222***  0.252*** 
  (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.006) 
SOUTH  0.343***  0.341***  0.331***  0.332***  0.390*** 
  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.005) 
2007  0.026***  0.023***  0.023***  0.029***  0.030*** 
  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.005) 
2008  1.096***  1.172***  1.156***  1.203***  1.099*** 
  (0.004)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.005) 
2009  1.528***  1.605***  1.583***  1.613***  1.544*** 
  (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.005) 
CRISIS*COLL    -0.315***  -0.272***     
    (0.008)  (0.008)     
CRISIS*PERS    -0.016***  -0.004     
    (0.005)  (0.005)     
RISK*COLL      -1.586***     
      (0.017)     
RISK*PERS      -0.516***     
      (0.012)     
LARGE        -0.581***   
        (0.004)   
Constant  2.980***  2.945***  2.919***  2.962***  3.170*** 
  (0.036)  (0.036)  (0.036)  (0.035)  (0.043) 
Observations  1,226,938  1,226,938  1,226,938  1,226,938  1,226,938 
Number of banks  214  214  214  214  214 
LR test re=0  0.00 (Conserv)  0.00 (Conserv)  0.00 (Conserv)  0.00 (Conserv)  0.00 (Conserv) 
AIC  4779265  4777795  4767747  4755467  4782450 
BIC  4779541  4778096  4768071  4755767  4782727 
Standard errors in parentheses¸  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   24 
 
Table 9 Random-effects parameters.  
SPD  Coef.  Std. Err.  z  P>z  [95% Conf. Interval] 
             
Standard dev (COLL)  0.49  0.03  17.76  0.00  0.44  0.54 
Standard dev (PERS)  0.16  0.01  15.64  0.00  0.14  0.18 
Standard dev (CONSTANT)  0.49  0.03  18.44  0.00  0.44  0.54 
Covariance (COLL, PERS)  0.67  0.06  11.34  0.00  0.55  0.78 
Covariance (COLL, CONSTANT)  0.33  0.03  12.35  0.00  0.28  0.38 
Covariance (PERS, CONSTANT)  1.39  0.13  10.70  0.00  1.13  1.64 
Standard dev (RESIDUAL)  1.70  0.00  1566.09  0.00  1.69  1.70 
 
 